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ScienceDirectIn this paper, I present a framework which considers three
independent factors that drive attentional selection. In addition
to goal-driven and stimulus-driven selection, I discuss how
lingering biases of selection history play a major role in
attentional selection. Visual statistical learning of the
regularities in the environment forms the basis for this history-
based selection which provides an elaborate and flexible
attentional biasing mechanism above and beyond goal-driven
and stimulus-driven factors. A selection based on experience
and history is fast, automatic and occurs without much, if any,
effort. I conclude that learning and extracting the distributional
properties of the environment have a major impact on
attentional selection.
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Introduction
In everyday life, we try to focus our attention to those
events that are relevant to us and ignore information that
could distract us. For example, when driving along a busy
road, we devote attention to traffic signs, road users, and
to locations in between parked cars searching for potential
‘targets’ such as children who may want to cross the road.
In the meantime, we try to ignore the buzzer of our
phone, the blinking light telling that you are almost
out of gas, and the visually loud billboards placed along
the road. The overload in input necessitates filtering and
attenuation, allowing some information to be prioritized
over other [1].
Traditionally, attentional selection was considered to be
the result of the interaction between the goals of the
observer (current selection goals) and the physical prop-
erties of the visual environment (salience of the objects)
[2–4]. Recently, however we [5–7] pointed out that inwww.sciencedirect.com many instances selection is neither the result of goals of
the observer nor the result of stimulus-driven factors (i.e.
bottom–up saliency). A third category of selection was
suggested, which we labelled ‘selection history’ referring
to the notion that previous attentional deployments can
elicit lingering and enduring selection biases that are
unrelated to the current goals nor related to the stimu-
lus-driven saliency of objects [7]. This notion of ‘selection
history’ as an important driver of attentional selection is
shared many others (see also Refs. [8–10]), even though in
previous studies these effects may have been falsely
labelled as being ‘top–down’, ([11] for a discussion see
Ref. [12]).
Priority map: stimulus-driven, goal-driven, and
history-driven factors
Current goals, physical salience, and selection history (see
Figure 1) all feed into an integrated priority map which
represents a conceptual framework accounting for selec-
tion priority. The priority map is assumed to be a winner-
take-all neural mechanism that guides the allocation of
covert and overt attention [2,13]. It is reasonable to
assume that at any moment in time these three factors
(goal-driven, stimulus-driven, and history-driven effects)
determine the weights within the spatial priority map.
Within this map, the weights are combined into a single
topographic representation of the environment, which
determines the selection priority (e.g. which location is
selected first, second, third etc.). As noted, individual
signals acting on the priority map originate from sensory
input (bottom–up), current goal states (top–down, or
behavioral relevance) and lingering selection biases (his-
tory driven). At any given time, these priority signals
compete with one another. For example, the well-known
attentional capture effect is a demonstration that bottom–
up salience signals may be so strong that they overshadow
(at least initially) goal-driven selection [7,14–16]. Figure 1
gives an overview of the likely brain regions that are
involved in generating these signals. There are many
cortical areas identified as candidate spatial priority maps
including the posterior parietal [17,18] and frontal cortex
[13,19].
Stimulus-driven selection
In its most extreme definition stimulus-driven selection
(or bottom–up attention) refers to a situation in which the
control of attention lies outside the organism: as soon as a
particular stimulus is presented, attention is directed to it.
Posner [20] called this ‘exogenous attention’ and referred
to it in terms of a physiological reflex. Research has shown
that this extreme view is not correct: by focusing attention
in a top–down way to a particular location in space, stimuliCurrent Opinion in Psychology 2019, 29:97–101
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Simplified overview of the different factors and presumed brain regions involved in attentional selection. The priority map emerges from a
distributed network involving frontal, partial, temporal areas. Goal-driven selection comes from frontal areas (including anterior cingulate);
Stimulus-driven bottom–up selection could come from early visual areas and structures like the superior colliculus [2]. Selection history (statistical
learning) is assumed to be represented at MTL (including hippocampus). These three signals feed into the priority map (possibly within the FEF
[60]) which ultimately determines selection (figure adapted from [61]).that are known to capture attention (such as abrupt
onsets) can be fully ignored [21–23]. Even though these
findings indicate that some control is possible, it is gen-
erally agreed that stimuli that stand out from their envi-
ronment have the ability to capture covert attention
[14,15] and overt attention [24,25]. Several computational
models have stressed the role of salience in attentional
selection [2,26]. These models take an image as input and
process the image in parallel across various feature chan-
nels using different spatial scales. The end result is a set
of topographic feature maps which are then combined
into a priority map coding selection priority in in terms of
salience (i.e. saliency map) [2]. There are several candi-
date brain areas that could serve as maps of saliency. For
example, the frontal eye field (FEF) [27], the lateral
intraparietal area (LIP) [18], the superior colliculus
[28], and the substantia nigra [29].
Goal-driven selection
Goal-driven selection, often called top–down attention, is
more difficult to define than stimulus-driven selection.
Some claim that any selection that is not stimulus-driven
(bottom–up) must be controlled from ‘the inside’, that is
in a top–down way [30]. Many use very broad categories
for top–down control referring to selection that is influ-
enced by ‘context, learning, or expectation’ [31]. Others
have stressed the aspect of volitional control. ForCurrent Opinion in Psychology 2019, 29:97–101 example, some claimed that “Top–down visual attention
is a voluntary process in which a particular location, feature, or
object relevant to current behavioral goals is selected internally
and focused upon” (p. 515 in Ref. [32]) and “volitional top–
down process, which can exert its influence through acts of will”
(p. 210 in Ref. [33]). It has also been argued that attention
can be guided in a top–down way even when guidance is
involuntary and inconsistent with goals and task set of the
observer [30,31]. Regardless of the exact definition of
goal-directed top–down control (see Refs. [30,31,34,35]
for a discussion), it is important to distinguish between
selection based on intentional, moment-to-moment, voli-
tional control (such as “I direct my attention to the right
side of the visual field, and on the next trial to the left side
of the visual field”) from selection that is driven by
previous selection episode (i.e. selection history [5,7]).
When this distinction is made, it is possible to study the
separate contributions and interactions of stimulus-
driven, goal-driven, and history-driven selection.
History-driven selection
Whenever attentional selection is driven by experiences
with previous selection episode one speaks about
‘history-driven selection’ [5,7]. It is crucial to realize that
objects can become prioritized in attentional selection
due to selection history even when these objects are not
salient (i.e. constitute no strong bottom–up signal) andwww.sciencedirect.com
Attentional selection Theeuwes 99even when these objects are completely irrelevant for the
task at hand (i.e. constitute no top–down signal). There
are several instances of how previous experiences affect
attentional selection.
Firstly, reward tied to a stimulus affects attentional selec-
tion even if the stimulus no longer predicts reward
delivery (see Ref. [6] for a review). These studies typi-
cally have two phases. During training, the successful
selection of the target is rewarded, resulting in a reward
association for the specific visual feature of the target.
During the test phase, participants search for a different
target and no rewards are delivered. The results show that
previously rewarded stimulus — even when the stimulus
is non-salient — captures attention and interferes for
search for the target. These results are well established
both in covert [37–40] and overt search [41,42].
Secondly, another well documented phenomenon of
selection history affecting current selection episodes is
‘priming’, which describes how a stimulus (feature) that
has been repeatedly attended in the past is more effi-
ciently selected and identified on the current trial [43].
Priming is well-documented in terms of its low-level
facilitatory effect on perceptual processing [43,44]. Mal-
jkovic and Nakayama [43], for example, demonstrated the
influence of priming in the context of a search task.
Priming between trials, or intertrial priming, occurred
for up to eight successive trials, even when participants
were unware of repetitions [45], or when they were
informed that the target was unlikely to be same between
trials [45].
Thirdly, participants seem to learn statistical regularities
present in the environment which in turn biases atten-
tional selection [46]. For example, research known under
the term ‘contextual cueing’ has shown that search for a
target is facilitated when it appears in a visual lay-out that
was previously searched relative to visual lay-outs that
were never searched before [47,48]; for a review see Ref.
[48]. In the classic paradigm, participants are instructed to
search for a ‘T’ target among ‘L’ distractors in sparsely
scattered configurations. Half of the display configura-
tions are repeated across blocks while others were only
seen once. The basic finding is that participants are faster
in finding targets when they appeared in repeated con-
figurations, suggesting that participants have learned the
association between the spatial configuration and the
target location. Recently, it was shown that people not
only learn the statistical regularities regarding the target
but also regularities about the distractor, which in princi-
ple are irrelevant for the task and not part of goal-driven
search [50–53]. Wang and Theeuwes [51–54] used the
well-established additional singleton task [14,15] and
independently manipulated the distributional properties
of the distractor. They demonstrated that when a dis-
tractor appeared more often in one location than in allwww.sciencedirect.com other locations, its distracting effect (the extent to which
it captured attention) was reduced. Moreover, if the target
happened to be presented at this location, selection of the
target was less efficient. There was also a gradient of
spatial suppression around this location, suggesting that
this location competed less for attention than all other
locations. Wang and Theeuwes [51] interpreted these
findings as evidence that statistical regularities can bias
attention such that within the attentional priority map,
the location that is likely to contain a distractor singleton
is suppressed relative to all other locations.
It is likely that priming and reward learning are special
cases of the overarching mechanism of visual statistical
learning (i.e. selection history [8]). There is ample evi-
dence that statistical learning takes place even though
most participants are not aware of the regularities in the
environment [36,47–49,51,54]. Statistical learning (his-
tory-driven selection) is fast, automatic, flexible and
occurs without much, if any, effort [7] and it is likely
that its effect on visual selection is large and much more
ubiquitous than previously assumed.
It is generally accepted that the medial temporal lobe
(MTL), and in particular the hippocampus, is critical for
the rapid extraction of regularities from the environment
[55–57]. The MTL has been known to play a crucial role
in the representation of space, and particularly allocentric
spatial location as demonstrated by the discovery of ‘place
cells’ in both rodents [58] and humans [59]. The assump-
tion is that activity in the MTL represents associations
between spatial and object regularities in the environ-
ment [55]. This activity pattern is then fed back to the
priority map affecting visual selection.
Conclusions
The outline discussed provides a novel framework to
study visual selection. The framework provides a context
to study how these signals (goal-driven, stimulus-driven
and history-driven) act on the spatial priority map, how
they interact, and in which time windows they operate.
For example, it is possible that history-based statistical
learning drives attention to one location in space, even
when observers effortfully in a goal-driven way try to
direct attention to another location. Wang and Theeuwes
have shown that history-driven effects can attenuate
attentional capture by salient singletons [50–52]; yet it
is unknown whether history-driven effects can
completely eliminate attentional capture, as was previ-
ously shown for top-down directed attention [21,22].
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